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Aiming for World Peace by Promoting ‘Violence’ in Education 
 
R. Scott Webster 
Monash University 
 
Abstract 
In order to contribute towards UNESCO’s goal of pursuing world peace, aims of education must transcend 
the limited scope of national self-interest which has dominated schooling systems in the West for the last two 
centuries and further back when the survival of each polis in Ancient Greece was of paramount importance.  
Aims must therefore become different and the environment that is thought best for this to occur is a 
democratic one.  The case is made that such a democratic environment should involve opportunities to 
evaluate the value of current aims of education and to explore others in light of the pressing need to pursue 
peace on a global scale.  In order to promote such a democratic environment of discussion and debate the 
notion of ‘violence’ is considered as a potential framework for such a re-evaluation.  The sort of ‘violence’ 
that is called for is in reference to its use by Emmanual Levinas who employed it emotively to misinterpret 
Kierkegaard.  The use of this misapplied term ‘violence’ may nevertheless be of use in initiating the sort of 
inquiry of a Deweyean type regarded here to be necessary to improve aims of education democratically in 
order to pursue world peace. 
 
The aim of UNESCO as stated in Article I of its Constitution, “is to contribute to peace and security by 
promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science, and culture in order to further 
universal respect for justice, for the rule of law, and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which 
are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language, or religion, by the 
Charter of the United Nations” (McKeon, 1951, p. v).  It is within this context that for the signatory nations 
of UNESCO at least, one would anticipate that their aims of education would reference peace, collaboration, 
respect, justice and rights for humanity in a global sense rather than express only limited aims of national 
self-interest, which has been the hallmark of educational aims since schooling became compulsory in the 
West, beginning in Germany almost two hundred years ago. 
 
In the late 1940s UNESCO recognised the need to undertake an inquiry into human rights.  This was later 
followed by a second inquiry into democracy as it was democratic contexts that were understood to be 
necessary in order for the aspects of ‘collaboration’ and international understandings to flourish.  This aspect 
was recognised by John Dewey who was one of the contributors to this symposium on democracy.  Here he 
stated that, “the entire activity of UNESCO is centred in promotion of inquiry, discussion, and conference” 
(Dewey, 1951, p. 62).  It would appear then that democracy requires ‘inquiry, discussion and conference’ 
and that this in turn requires regular re-evaluations of dominant world views which drive all aims of 
education. 
 
In his contribution to this UNESCO symposium, Dewey gave what could be regarded to be a warning as well 
as a commentary on the success or otherwise of the role of UNESCO.  He stated that “Given the present state 
of affairs both at home and in connection with other states, the way and degree in which we use or fail to use 
freedom of inquiry and public communication may well be the criterion by which in the end the genuineness 
of our democracy will be decided in all issues” (Dewey, 1951, p. 66).  Here Dewey stressed the importance 
of exercising what he appreciated was a freedom to inquire and that this was a criterion of genuine 
democracy.  This freedom, which he made clear in his various writings, was to enable persons to inquire into 
all sorts of issues.  He was therefore opposed to any forms of dogma which he described as “fatal” to inquiry 
(Dewey, 1991a, p. 325).  He identified that while freedom of inquiry was usually tolerated in the natural 
sciences, there was a tendency not to extend this tolerance into values, art, morality and religion, which were 
often treated to exist in a different realm to the physical materials under ‘natural’ scientific investigation.  He 
was opposed to this assumption of two separate realms and argued that inquiry should be allowed the 
freedom to exist in these other aspects of human existence. 
 
It is this second ‘realm’ of non-physical beliefs and values that one finds the various world-views from 
which aims of education are derived.  I will now review Dewey’s notion of inquiry with respect to this 
second ‘realm’ in particular and explore how his notions of freedom and democracy could extend into how 
we should be open to inquiring into these in order to expose our aims of education to democratic deliberation 
in order to pursue the development of aims which can contribute to UNESCO’s mandate for world peace. 
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Dewey’s notion of Inquiry 
 
Dewey was opposed to ‘knowledge’ as being the central focus of education.  Rather he famously promoted 
the idea that educators should be learner-centred, that is, learners should be transformed into being able to 
participate in life in a certain manner that differentiated them from being uneducated.  He described this 
educated manner variously, but often as the ability to inquire, think, and think reflectively.  Dewey’s work 
followed that of Charles Peirce (1958, p. 99) who described inquiry as the “struggle to attain a state of 
belief” caused by an “irritation of doubt”.  Dewey (1991b, pp. 14-16) also described inquiry as being related 
to doubt, but rather than ending this irritation by the formulation of a ‘belief’ or ‘knowledge’, he much 
preferred the term “warranted assertion” because this gives reference to the presence of an inquiry and is not 
a ‘stand alone’ element.  Recently this has been usefully described by Boyles (2006) in the following: 
 
Warranted assertions replace justification in the traditional syllogism while at the same time 
imploding the syllogism itself.  Where justification served a correspondence theory of truth in the 
traditional account of knowledge, warranted assertions merge truth and inquiry together… The point, 
instead, is the interdependency of truths and the processes of inquiry… “Knowledge” is not the focal 
point of epistemology for Dewey: “knowing” is. (Boyles, 2006, p. 61) 
 
This learner-centred approach which focuses on ‘knowing’ as a way-of-being rather than acquiring the 
product of knowledge is quite at odds with what we all too often witness in our systems of current schooling.  
Indeed Boyles argues that it is the traditional form of epistemology implicating a correspondence theory of 
truth which is dominant in U.S. classrooms and consequently stifles inquiry.  He concludes that “most public 
school classrooms continue to be stultifying arenas of indoctrination” (Boyles, 2006, p. 68).  Indoctrination 
has been described variously, but with reference to preventing active and free inquiry, I quite like Merry’s 
(2005, p. 406) recent description as involving “crippled reflective capacities” because without the ability to 
reflect one becomes a passive and compliant element which further enables dogmatism to reign. 
 
Dewey (1991c, p. 13) described the notion of reflection or ‘reflective thinking’ as “the attitude of suspended 
conclusion” which is required in order “to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and 
protracted inquiry”.  Elsewhere Dewey argued that the notion of ‘knowledge’ tended to terminate thinking 
altogether because the element of doubt was removed.  He was opposed to this total removal of doubt by 
arguing that all the conclusions which are reached as a result of inquiry should lend themselves to other 
questions being raised for further inquiry and should not quench the questioning spirit.  Dogma on the other 
hand, presents the conclusion before any inquiry commences and therefore stifles both the implications of 
certain doctrine and also the end purposes, or aims of the doctrine themselves.  Dewey argued that: 
 
Just because knowing is not self-enclosed and final but is instrumental to reconstruction of 
situations, there is always danger that it will be subordinated to maintaining some preconceived 
purpose or prejudice.  Then reflection ceases to be complete; it falls short. (Dewey, 1988, p. 163) 
 
In order to promote this approach of constant inquiry where conclusions are suspended in order to maintain a 
healthy state of doubt, Dewey often referred to the scientific method.  Not that science demonstrates a 
particular ‘method’ as such (Feyerabend, 2003), but rather it was the experimental attitude or way-of-being 
that Dewey seemed to value, one that constantly scrutinizes, critiques and actively experiments.  Again this 
reference to science is found in the works of Peirce who in turn referenced Francis Bacon.  In his book 
Reconstruction of Philosophy, Dewey (1988) contrasted the scientific and experimental approach of Bacon 
with that of Aristotle.  He described Bacon’s approach as an invasion of the unknown through active 
experimentation and discovery, and Aristotle’s as primarily involving demonstration and persuasion of what 
was already known.  The former he termed as first-hand experience and the latter as second-hand 
experience.  This has obvious implications for pedagogy in educative settings as only the former promotes a 
sense of being free to inquire. 
 
Central to Dewey’s notion of the scientific attitude which activates inquiry is a healthy acceptance of doubt.  
He suggested that: 
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The scientific attitude may almost be defined as that which is capable of enjoying the doubtful; 
scientific method is, in one aspect, a technique for making a productive use of doubt by converting it 
into operations of definite inquiry.  No one gets far intellectually who does not “love to think,” and 
no one loves to think who does not have an interest in problems as such. (Dewey, 1929, p. 228) 
 
It was a concern to Dewey however that this scientific attitude to freely inquire into the nature of matter was 
all too often only tolerated in the physical realm and was not so easily tolerated in the realm of social and 
moral matters.  He observed that: 
 
Outside of physical inquiry, we shy from problems; we dislike uncovering serious difficulties in their 
full depth and reach; we prefer to accept what is and muddle along.  Hence our social and moral 
“sciences” consist largely in putting facts as they are into conceptual systems framed at large.  Our 
logic in social and humane subjects is still largely that of definition and classification as until the 
seventeenth century it was in natural science.  For the most part the lesson of experimental inquiry 
has still to be learned in the things of chief concern.  (Dewey, 1929, p. 251) 
 
Here he laments that the studies of the social sciences had not advanced as natural science had because they 
did not promote the freedom to inquire into the social ‘norms’ which were all too often accepted superficially 
as ‘given’.  Consequently the “things of chief concern” still remain to be properly examined.  As Dewey 
(1958, p. 383) stated elsewhere, “the greater part of life goes on in a darkness unillumined by thoughtful 
inquiry.” 
 
One of these ‘things of chief concerns’ is of course education, which Dewey (1929, p. 252) argued is 
possibly “the most significant”.  This is because he considered it as institutionally representing intelligent 
action while being the key to the reconstruction of society.  He described the institutional education of his 
time as largely remaining unenlightened by thoughtful inquiry, describing it as continuing to inculcate fixed 
conclusions (e.g. dogma) and failing to develop the intelligence of learners.  While these comments are 
almost eighty years old I consider them to quite accurately reflect the practices that are predominantly found 
in the current schooling of the West and would like to encourage ourselves as educators to reconsider 
Dewey’s claim that ‘scientific’ forms of inquiry should be present in education, in particular, the aims of 
education themselves which determine the actual experiences offered to learners in the twenty-first century. 
 
 
Aims of Education 
 
According to Dewey (1985, p. 114) we do “well to remind ourselves that education as such has no aims.  
Only persons, parents, and teachers, etc., have aims, not an abstract idea like education.”  He warned against 
passively accepting aims handed down from authorities in such a manner that they could not be critiqued, 
and also questioned whether there could even be aims which were ‘general and ultimate’ because each 
person’s existence consists in specific activities and the meanings of these should not be limited in advance 
by restrictive aims.  R.S. Peters also recognised the abstract nature of the term ‘education’ and like Dewey, 
claimed that it does not have any aims of itself.  He argued that “the quick reply to the question ‘What is the 
aim of education?’ must resemble the quick reply to the question ‘What is the aim of life?’, namely ‘It has 
not got one’” (Peters, 1973, p. 1).  In this same article, Peters argued that as life itself is apparently pointless, 
then education should enable persons to come to terms with this and be able to give point to life.  Peters 
appears to promote quite an existential perspective in this particular article. 
 
However the holistic view of Dewey can also be understood to portray quite an existential perspective too.  It 
would be difficult however, to apply the label ‘existentialist’ to Dewey – or for that matter any other label 
because he appears to be too complex to be easily categorised.  But he does refer to the entire ‘life of the 
child’ that should be centred for education – in contrast to the often centred cognitive understandings as per 
the various forms of constructivism.  He identified what he referred to as “the existential matrix of inquiry” 
(Dewey, 1991b) as consisting of both the biological and cultural embeddedness of individuals and which 
subsequently greatly influences how individuals make meanings from what they understand to be significant.  
He recognised that all of our activities, even the ‘logical’ and ‘scientific’ ones, are all given sense and 
activated upon by purposes which emerge out of a background or framework of personal significance. 
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This is much like the ‘horizon of significance’ that Charles Taylor (1991, p. 37) refers, who also describes it 
as the “background of intelligibility” against which our various experiences can be given their meanings.  He 
describes that this horizon consists of “(a) our notions of the good.. (b) our understandings of self… (c) the 
kinds of narrative in which we make sense of our lives, and (d) conceptions of society” (Taylor, 1989, p. 
105).  He argues that there is a connection between all four of these aspects which in their unity give sense to 
our personal identity and also give purpose and meaning to our lives.  It is from this horizon then that both of 
Peters’ questions are to be answered – the aim of life and the aim of education. 
 
This notion of a ‘horizon’ as the background of life’s meanings and which provides personal significance, 
plays a very important role in the works of Dewey – although he does not directly use this same terminology.  
Even although he can be understood to be a supporter of democracy and the reconstruction of society, he 
argued that all of this is only made possible by individual persons, as social beings, being committed to 
something they regard to be personally significant.  He encouraged those of us who have aims of education 
not to set our sights on only nationalistic agendas.  He identified that such limited aims which are focussed 
on living well only within narrowly defined interests are simply a continuation of the intention behind the 
introduction of compulsory schooling which originated in Germany.  The emphasis then consisted of both 
national unity and national military defence.  He encouraged a much more global vision of humanity in 
general such as espoused by UNESCO and argued that the “proper end of education” should be “the 
promotion of the best possible realization of humanity as humanity” beyond any nationalistic agendas 
(Dewey, 1985, p. 101).  He then asked the question, “Who, then, shall conduct education so that humanity 
may improve?”, and answered with the following: 
 
We must depend upon the efforts of enlightened men [sic] in their private capacity. …Simply 
through the efforts of persons of enlarged inclinations, who are capable of grasping the ideal of a 
future better condition, is the gradual approximation of human nature to its end possible..” (Dewey, 
1985, pp. 101-2) 
 
Dewey’s notion of democracy in education is one that involves the interests of all involved parties – parents, 
teachers, administrators and of course the learners themselves.  All individuals are to be moved by 
understanding significance in pursuing personal commitments to certain social relationships and ‘habits of 
mind’ towards a better future which transcends various forms of national self-interest.  The various horizons 
of understanding should include the UNESCO attributes of collaboration, respect, justice and rights if world 
peace is to be seriously included as an aim of education. 
 
Through Dewey we are reminded that the origin of our schooling systems is one which promoted national 
unity and security by promoting a culture in the mass population that sought after national or local self-
interests.  We can see through the practices of our current schooling that this original aim of schooling 
continues to dominate here in Australia.  Even the most recent federal government’s efforts at values 
education include nationalistic ‘Australian’ ideas on values and military symbols such as heroes from 
Gallipoli.  The challenge then, if aims of education are to take up the challenge of UNESCO in seeking peace 
between nations, is to, as Dewey described, formulate a vision of humanity in general – beyond national self 
interests.  But how is this to be achieved? 
 
 
Aims of Education as Inquiry 
 
Using a Deweyean perspective, I am arguing that aims of education, whether one is a parent, teacher or 
learner, should be forms of inquiry.  Consequently there should be an intellectual thoroughness invested in 
these aims.  In addition, once articulated, these aims should continue to be open for further inquiry as to the 
value that they might or might not hold for particular subsequent experiences if they are to be appropriate for 
democratic contexts.  That is as an inquiry, these aims are never ‘finished’ or finalised, they are continually 
being reconstructed.  Every activity that we engage ourselves has some aim, some ‘end purpose’ to it.  These 
ends provide the significance of the meanings we give to these activities.  However, as ends, or in Dewey’s 
terms, ‘ends-in-view’ these should emerge as a consequence of our giving meaning to our experiences and 
should not dictate the conclusions of our experiences in advance.  Consequently it is necessary that these 
aims, as ends-in-view, be dynamic and responsive to each succeeding experience in which we engage 
ourselves. 
 5
 
One of the many dualisms that Dewey was opposed to was the notion that there are two realms – one of 
physical substances and one of values and morals.  In the former he observed that there is almost universal 
agreement that the scientific ‘method’ – or attitude – has enabled physical science to progress as a 
consequence of its experimental procedures.  This includes the aims and purposes for science also being 
inquired into by being ‘doubtful’ as to their validity.  Inquiry in science is free to scrutinize, critique and 
experiment with the various materials which are considered of interest to particular aims.  However, this 
sense of inquiry is not equally free to investigate in the ‘realm’ of values and morality where the ‘ends-in-
view’ are often ‘off-limits’ to experiment.  Dewey described this as a form of dogma, where ends are given 
by authorities but do not lend themselves to be inquired into.  They must be accepted as ‘givens’. 
 
Communities are understood to exist because of common aims and aspirations which are communicated with 
each other and with younger generations.  This commonality between the terms ‘communities’, ‘common’ 
and ‘communication’ was recognised by Dewey in the first chapter of his book Democracy and Education.  
This is all the more significant if the community we envisage is a global one, involving the commitment of 
people world-wide to the common aspirations of understanding others and securing peace.  The necessity for 
a democratic environment then can be appreciated in order for this openness of discussion and inquiry to take 
place.  Indeed Dewey argued that the communication of such aspirations to the younger generations is 
basically what education is about.  However the nature of this communication is not one of transmission.  It 
does not involve the ‘hammering in’ of beliefs to impressionable minds as this could not amount to more 
than, as Dewey (1985, p. 22) described, conveying “second-hand information as to what others think”.  
Rather it involves an invitation into a democratic environment in order to discuss and explore how human 
betterment might be made possible, and where the ‘best ideas’ are up for re-evaluation and reconstruction.  
Dewey (1985, p. 23) therefore concluded that “we never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the 
environment.” 
 
The educative value of indirect communication has also been recognised by Søren Kierkegaard who 
understood that direct communication had little effect in enabling people to change their minds.  He often 
wrote pseudonymous works in order to challenge some of the commonly accepted ‘givens’ in his country of 
Denmark.  In one of his more ‘direct’ writings, he explained why he wrote indirectly.  He explained that 
most self-professed Christians were under an illusion in calling themselves by the name ‘Christian’ and he 
also observed “that an illusion is not easy to remove” (Kierkegaard, 1998, p. 42).  He then went on to argue 
how an illusion could be removed by arguing that: 
 
An illusion can never be removed directly, and basically only indirectly.  If it is an illusion that all 
are Christians, and if something is to be done, it must be done indirectly, not by someone who loudly 
declares himself to be an extraordinary Christian, but by someone who, better informed, even 
declares himself not to be a Christian.  That is, one who is under an illusion must be approached 
from behind. (Kierkegaard, 1998, p. 43) 
 
One of his pseudonymous authors was Johannes Climacus, who indeed professed not to be a Christian.  He 
stated that “At one time it was perilous to profess being a Christian; now it is precarious to doubt that one is” 
(Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 51).  But doubt was considered by Kierkegaard to be essential for reflection and 
therefore well worth living a life of precariousness.  He argued that doubt was often experienced as an 
anxiety, and that anxiety was the interface between possibility and actuality (Kierkegaard, 1980).  Doubt is 
therefore a necessary experience if one is to leap into the unknown, to become transformed or educated in 
some valuable way.  He too valued a healthy form of doubt as enabling the possibility of further change, 
education or becoming, and he identified that indirect communication is essential for this development to 
occur. 
 
Kierkegaard (1992, p. 74) identified that direct communication required one to be certain, to not have any 
doubts whatsoever, and claimed that this must be impossible if persons are to be considered as being 
perpetually in a process of becoming.  He argued that “one who is existing is continually in the process of 
becoming… the perpetual process of becoming is the uncertainty of earthly life, in which everything is 
uncertain” (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 86).  This description of uncertainty as the existential challenge for human 
existence is remarkably similar to Dewey (1958, p. 41) who described that “Man finds himself living in an 
aleatory world; his existence involves, to put it baldly, a gamble.  The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, 
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unstable, uncannily unstable.  Its dangers are irregular, inconstant, not to be counted upon as to their times 
and seasons.”  While Dewey’s focus was primarily upon reconstructing society and Kierkegaard’s was on re-
evaluating Christianity, both understood human life as one of uncertainty.  In one of his footnotes, 
Kierkegaard’s Climacus explains how reflection is difficult because it requires one to accept and live with 
this uncertainty of life, to always have one’s conclusions suspended (to use Dewey’s description), when one 
is open to infinite possibilities of meanings.  He argues that: 
 
The thoroughly educated and developed individuality is known by how dialectical the thinking is in 
which he has his daily life.  To have his daily life in the decisive dialectic of the infinite and yet to go 
on living – that is the art.  Most people have comfortable categories for daily use and the categories 
of the infinite only on solemn occasions, that is, they never have them.  But to have the dialectic of 
the infinite for daily use and to exist in it is, of course, the greatest strenuousness, and in turn the 
greatest strenuousness is needed lest the practice, instead of exercising a person in existing, 
deceptively trick him out of it. – It is well known that a cannonade makes a person unable to hear, 
but it is also well known that by persevering one can hear every word just as when all is quiet.  And 
that is the way it is with a spiritual existence intensified by reflection. (Kierkegaard, 1982, p. 86) 
 
Here Kierkegaard stressed that to be in a state of authentic existence, in a state of becoming, it requires a 
continued willingness to endure doubt and uncertainty in order to reflect, and that this is a most difficult 
thing to do – and yet is most essential for our existing as human persons.  I consider this to accord very well 
with Dewey’s conception of inquiry as a way-of-being, because he argued that our ultimate meanings of life, 
such as what it means to be a Christian, should always be open for doubt, critique and re-evaluation. 
 
 
Inquiry as ‘Violence’ 
 
While Kierkegaard openly called himself a ‘villain’ because he concealed himself in pseudonymous authors 
and attempted to deceive his readers into living a more authentic existence, he has been accused by others in 
various defamatory ways.  David Breese (1990, p. 217) a former president of Christian Destiny Ministries, 
claimed that Kierkegaard’s Existentialism is similar to other atheistic existentialists who all deny “any 
consistent morality”.  Probably more damning however is Emmanuel Levinas who stated: 
 
What disturbs me in Kierkegaard may be reduced to two points. 
The first point.  Kierkegaard rehabilitated the subjectivity – the unique, the singular – with 
comparable strength… 
The second point.  It is Kierkegaard’s violence that shocks me.  The manner of the strong and the 
violent, who fear neither scandal nor destruction, has come, since Kierkegaard and before Nietzsche, 
a manner of philosophy.  One philosophizes with a hammer.  In that permanent scandal [or 
“permanent provocation” as per Rée’s 1998 translation], in that opposition to everything, I perceive 
by anticipation the echoes of certain cases of verbal violence … I am thinking not only of National 
Socialism… That harshness of Kierkegaard emerges at the exact moment when he transcends 
ethics”… The ethical means the general, for Kierkegaard. (Levinas, 1996, p. 76) 
 
In this comment the emotive term ‘violence’ is employed to offer an almost self-evident condemnation on 
Kierkegaard, especially so when in the same paragraph Levinas also refers to the National Socialism which 
was behind the extermination of so many of his fellow Jews.  Levinas, himself a survivor of the Nazi horrors, 
specifically refers to Kierkegaard’s ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ as portrayed in his book Fear and 
Trembling as an example of his ‘permanent provocation’.  Here Kierkegaard claimed that the ethical was the 
universal, it applied to all persons for every moment and for every experience of their lives.  It was its own 
telos (end, purpose) and did not need to refer to anything beyond itself for its purpose.  No horizons of 
significance are necessary to grant it value.  Therefore he concluded that ethically speaking the biblical 
patriarch Abraham is guilty of murder as he intended to murder his son Isaac.  However he drew attention to 
the paradox that religiously speaking (in contrast to the ethical) Abraham did not have the intent of murder 
but rather had the intent of sacrifice.  He stated: 
 
Faith is namely this paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal – yet, please note, 
in such a way that the movement repeats itself, so that after having been in the universal he as the 
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single individual isolates himself as higher than the universal.  If this is not faith, then Abraham is 
lost…” (Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 55) 
 
Here Kierkegaard has endeavoured to explain that the religious relation one has with the divine being of God 
might be such that one is required to go beyond ethical duty.  Levinas (1996, p. 77) however contended that 
an opposite interpretation of this same event is possible and claimed that “Abraham’s attentiveness to the 
voice that led him back to the ethical order, in forbidding him to perform a human sacrifice, is the highest 
point in the drama.”  Quite obviously there is more in this comment than a philosophical critique.  
Kierkegaard was engaging with the Christological significance of Isaac as the son of Abraham being in 
effect ‘dead’ for the journey of three days and three nights to the mountain where he was then ‘resurrected’, 
whereas Levinas is coming from the Jewish perspective which maintains the integrity of the ten 
commandments, including of course ‘thou shalt not kill’.  What Levinas therefore fails to appreciate is that 
Kierkegaard is inviting a serious reflection upon the meaning and significance that one assumes one’s 
personal existence to have in the context of being a Christian.  He is evoking a certain amount of doubt 
through the paradoxes he presents in order for persons to inquire further into their own existence.  In his 
indirect writings designed to provoke, he frequently asks ‘what is the meaning of life?’ and in particular for 
his own special purpose, ‘what does it really mean to be a Christian?’. 
 
This call to inquire into ethics, values, religion and morality by Kierkegaard is actually described by Levinas 
to be ‘violent’.  Presumably Levinas would just as quickly employ this term ‘violent’ to describe Jesus 
because he claimed “I did not come to bring peace, but a sword” (Matthew 10:34) and yet I doubt if he 
would also call scientific inquiries into sub-atomic particles being smashed in proton accelerators a ‘violent’ 
affair.  This brings us back to the problem identified by Dewey earlier that we assume a two realm existence 
– one for physical science, where one is free to inquire, and the other of values and morality where inquiry 
into assumed authoritative principles and truths, such as the Jewish Ten Commandments, is ‘off limits’.  Not 
only does Dewey call for the ‘scientific’ approach to being free to inquire as also having relevance in the 
‘realm’ of values and morality, but scientists are also calling for this inquiry involving the subjectivity and 
‘passion’ of humanity to also be more clearly recognised in the sciences themselves.  According to 
Feyerabend (1993, p. 154), “I believe that a reform of the sciences that makes them more anarchic and more 
subjective (in Kierkegaard’s sense) is urgently needed.”  There is not a two-realm division between physical 
materialism and the subjectivity of human persons with their passions, horizons of significance, values and 
personal aims and purposes – including aims of education. 
 
While I object to Levinas’s use of the term ‘violence’ in describing the works of Kierkegaard, the adoption 
of such an emotive term can in fact be used to provoke a call to freely inquire into the purposes and aims of 
education.  This of course is a playful use of the term ‘violence’ and is also in keeping with much of the 
works of Nietzsche (1990, p. 32) who encouraged his readers to take a hammer to the various idols that we 
too often assume are ‘givens’.  If he encouraged the use of a hammer in an assumed realm of only physical 
materials he would most likely not be as misunderstood and objected to as we currently witness, but because 
he has ventured into the ‘other realm’ of values, religion and morality with his hammer we witness many like 
Levinas who take offence.  It is this other realm where of course we find purposes and aims for education 
and it is here that I would encourage a ‘violent’ hammering. 
 
 
Promoting ‘Violence’ in Education 
 
I should qualify here that I am not employing the term ‘violence’ in any manner that might be construed as 
an attack upon the rights or well-being of persons or of any other living entities.  I am simply employing it in 
the emotive sense to which Levinas has used it above, in order to provoke an indirect and ‘shocking’ tactic 
which encourages persons to inquire more deeply than they might otherwise be inclined.  Therefore as the 
topic to be addressed is ‘aims of education’, I am encouraging that we should foster a ‘violent’ hammering of 
the aims of education that various persons have, including pre-service teachers, teachers, students, 
administrators and politicians.  This involves an engagement with the bigger issues as to what education is 
thought to be aiming at and to see if it compares favourably with UNESCO’s aim of world peace. 
 
My telos for adopting the almost confrontational approach is in line with Dewey’s arguments – to allow for 
the possibility of forming better ends-in-view or ‘aims’ with regards to education in the particular contexts in 
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which we find ourselves.  This engagement allows opportunity to address what is meant by the ‘good life’ 
and can be employed to determine whether particular aims are supporting only narrow nationalistic interests 
or more valuably – the interests of humanity in general and contributes towards UNESCO’s primary aim. 
 
It is argued here that to be ‘violent’ towards particular aims of education simply means, in Nietzschean 
terms, to re-evaluate them.  It means to be willing to inquire into the value that aims might have for current 
situations.  It is contended here that this re-evaluation into aims of education requires them to be doubted and 
that this can often be facilitated by indirect communication.  Such inquiries do not rely upon any intrinsic 
value being held by particular aims.  The value of aims can only be understood in terms of their relation to 
how significance is understood within specific experiences and their relation to horizons of significance.  
Pring (1976, pp. 6-7) usefully reminds us of the specificity of aims of education when he asks ‘what does it 
mean to educate these pupils?’ as being distinctively different from the more general question ‘what does it 
mean to educate these pupils?’.  This latter question asks us for our understanding regarding the general 
nature of education, while the former refers to a specific situation, for how a certain ‘betterment’ (Peters 
1967, p. 25) might be offered to particular persons at a particular time.  Such specific aims of education can 
only be developed in particular contexts otherwise we would need to refer to learners in general and overlook 
the unique individuals that we as educators encounter. 
 
Charles Taylor (1991, p. 18) has identified that the opportunity to engage with and contribute to discussions 
of the good life, what the meaning and purposes of life might be, has been banished to the margins of 
political debate.  He is very much in favour of bringing such discussions into the open by individually 
committing ourselves to democratically deliberating in public forums what ought to be our end purposes.  
This holds a special challenge for education because so often aims are ‘off limits’ for critique as some 
governments claim they have already determined what these will be through their identified outcomes and 
standards.   
 
For example the Victorian Department of Education and Training (DE&T), while attempting to restrict the 
definition of ‘professionalism’ for teachers to include only their specialised knowledge and skills in their 
particular content areas and has also restricted learning to an effective rather than educative activity.  They 
specifically emphasise that it is solely the role of the other government department called the Victorian 
Curriculum Assessment Authority to “define what students should know and be able to do at different levels 
of schooling” and therefore teachers, as professionals, are excluded from entering into debate on the value of 
these particular aims (DE&T, 2005, p. 3).  This State government department is marginalising any discussion 
on the aims of education as outlined in their Victorian Essential Learning Standards by so called 
‘professional’ teachers.  This is quite at odds however with the Senate (2003) of the Federal Parliament who 
specifically have articulated that as professionals, teachers should have “control of standards” as developed 
through educative aims.  This latter view is also consistent with the former Director of the Department of 
Educational Studies at the University of Oxford – Richard Pring (2004, p. 75) – who argued that the 
significance of professionalism for teachers, refers to “a body of people who, by reason of distinctive 
expertise and values, are to be regarded with respect to what should be learnt, how it should be learnt, and 
what purposes that learning should serve.”  The Victorian government, by attempting to exclude teachers 
from critiquing and discussing their aims and standards, are at odds with how professionalism is understood 
by other significant parties, and are guilty of attempting to banish any such discussions as described above 
by Taylor. 
 
Similarly to Dewey and Peirce, Taylor argues that the scientific (experimental) method of Bacon should be 
adopted in the field of morality and life purposes, explaining: 
 
Francis Bacon criticized the traditional Aristotelian sciences for having contributed nothing “to 
relieve the condition of mankind.”  He proposed in their stead a model of science whose criterion of 
truth would be instrumental efficacy.  You have discovered something when you can intervene to 
change things.  Modern science is in essential continuity in this respect with Bacon.  But what is 
important about Bacon is that he reminds us that the thrust behind this new science was not only 
epistemological by also moral. (Taylor, 1991, p. 104) 
 
Here Taylor expresses a view of ‘truth’ that is akin to the pragmatist perspective.  As such, ends in 
themselves can be inquired into in order to improve them.  As ends determine the value of aims through how 
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they are understood to relate specific experiences to an overall horizon of significance, they in themselves 
should be part of the deliberation of re-evaluation. 
 
Taylor explains that this ability to participate in discussions about ends and aims requires employing what he 
describes as ‘democratic initiative’.  But he warns that this democratic initiative has been weakened by 
market economic forces and over-bureaucratic state control (Taylor, 1991, p. 112).  This point is also 
identified in John Ralston Saul’s The Unconscious Civilization (1997) who adds that creativity and inquiry is 
prevented by the imposition of a ‘fixed world view’ by these same economic and political forces.  He claims 
that “we do live in a corporatist society, where the public good is minimized” and where opportunity to 
inquire into this imposed one world view is discouraged because corporatism itself creates a conformist 
consciousness among citizens (Saul, 1997, pp. 94 & 139).  Part of his solution is to promote democracy by 
encouraging individuals to become more actively involved in the democratic process.  Another aspect of his 
solution is to shake up governments with “a severe crisis” to remind them of their responsibilities.  This 
notion of a ‘severe crisis’ is similar to how I am conceptualising the use of ‘violence’ in order to encourage 
us to inquire into our own horizons of significance and also the world-views which drive the aims of 
education prescribed by authorities. 
 
To prevent opportunity to inquire into the world-views which dominate our practices in a community to 
accept dogma – is tantamount to oppression.  Paulo Freire claimed that oppressive regimes by their very 
nature do not permit persons under their domain who are ‘oppressed’ to ever question ‘Why?’   He 
concluded that “any situation in which some individuals prevent others from engaging in the process of 
inquiry is one of violence” (Freire, 2000, p. 85), where ‘violence’ may not necessary be physical abuse, but 
is certainly an oppression of them as human persons and their ability to question, inquire, critique and make 
their own decisions.  I am also employing the term ‘violence’ here as a recommended response to the 
‘violence’ (as per Freire) of oppressors, but I quite accept that others may opt for a peaceable protest as being 
a more appropriate response.  I am therefore using the term ‘violence’ in a very restricted sense as mentioned 
above. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
If ‘violence’ can be understood here as Levinas has employed it – to represent a ‘permanent provocation’ by 
taking a hammer to world views, the meanings of life, values and aims in order to re-evaluate them,  then this 
is the sort of existential violence I am asking us to consider adopting for our various aims of education.  The 
purpose of this is to keep the democratic spirit alive and oppose dogmatism.  It is only possible to have 
‘inquiry, discussion and conference’ as Dewey has called for, if there are opposing points of view.  This may 
require us to consider other perspectives via indirect communication in order to re-evaluate the aims that we 
consider to be most valuable.  Becoming existentially ‘violent’ to sound out educational aims and the world 
views from which they emerge, does not necessarily equate to rejecting them.  Through the process of 
inquiry we can become much more appreciative and passionate about them. 
 
A Nietzschean re-evaluation of values, or in our case, evaluating the value of educational aims, accords well 
with Dewey and his notion of inquiry.  He argued that our actions are driven by our judgments and that these 
in turn are formed through e-valuations.  He stated: 
 
I now come to consideration of judgments about valuings-values; namely to the topic of e-valuations.  
…I would say that there are such events as e-valuating inquiries terminating in judgments…  It 
seems to be generally admitted that genuine inquiry, resulting in genuine judgments, is possible and 
desirable in the case of so-called instrumental values.  But it is often held that in the case of so-called 
final or ultimate values all that is possible is communication of a particular item of information, 
namely, that they are or have been valued, plus strangely enough, in some cases, the assertion that 
they ought to be universally valued, although no reason can be given beyond the assertion that they 
are “ends in themselves.”  As against this view, which is bound to play “logically” and practically 
into the hands of external “authorities,” formulation of a comprehensive theory of the connection of 
evaluations with de facto occurrent valuings is indispensable. (Dewey, 1991a, p. 353) 
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Here Dewey adds to his case against intrinsic values as they tend to restrict inquiry and play too readily into 
the hands of authorities to allow them to, in Freire’s terms, ‘oppress’ through dogma.  Dewey explained that 
principles such as values, purposes or aims which are presented as if they did have intrinsic value and hence 
are ‘off limits’ to being provoked and inquired into, could lead to fanaticism where any means could be 
justified in order to attain their ends.  For education this could equate to any form of pedagogy being 
tolerated if the sanctioned standard outcomes of authorities are being attained. 
 
An important aspect of the discussion and deliberation that is characteristic of individuals exercising their 
democratic initiative is that better ends might emerge.  To pursue UNESCO’s primary aim of world peace by 
examining what it might mean to aim to educate humanity as humanity beyond national identities, requires 
some different approaches to what has characteristically been aimed for to date in institutionalised education.  
In order to improve upon the various ‘normal’ aims of education currently practised, there is a requirement to 
have some abnormal aims to consider.  This is exactly the point argued by Thomas Kuhn (1970) in relation 
to science, that abnormal thinking is responsible for revolutionising our understandings within this field of 
study.  However Dewey (1991a, p. 391) remarked that intellectuals, at least the ones he observed in his day, 
tended to avoid the potential ‘violent’ aspects often associated with revolutions and opted instead for the 
slower but more sure manner of evolutionary development.   I, however, am arguing against our inclination 
to adopt slower evolutionary change because I suspect that implicit in this attitude is also a weakening of our 
democratic initiative as Taylor warns.  Instead I am asking us to consider doubting the often taken-for-
granted aims of education that we as individual professionals have and those of our governments in order to 
foster a climate of discussion, debate and inquiry.  As I consider that it is only in such a democratic 
environment that our aims of education, by being ‘violently’ re-evaluated through philosophical hammering, 
can transcend national self-interest and be able to contribute to UNESCO’s pursuit of world peace. 
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